The Brexit negotiations and financial services:a two-level game analysis by James, Scott & Quaglia, Lucia
The Brexit negotiations and financial services: a two-level game analysis

Scott James (King’s College London)





This paper examines the state of the art of the Brexit negotiations in the area of financial services. It uses a two-level game model to explain the positions of UK and EU negotiators on the basis of the domestic constraints they face, and to consider the scope for final agreement based on the ‘win-set’ of both sides. The paper analyses the preferences and power of three main groups of players within the UK and EU: the political authorities, financial regulators, and the financial industry. We argue that the scope for agreement on financial services has been severely hampered by political and regulatory constraints which forced UK and EU negotiators to adopt early hawkish negotiating positions, and by the absence of a unified position from the financial industry. After the 2017 general election, the position of the UK Government and UK financial industry briefly converged, thereby narrowing the domestic win-set but also increasing the scope for agreement. However, the July 2018 ‘Chequers’ deal represents a hardening of the UK government’s position on financial services. We argue that this reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators – acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels – has become more, not less, acute over time.





In June 2016, the result of the referendum on the United Kingdom’s (UK) membership of the European Union (EU) indicated a small majority in favour of leaving the EU. In March 2017, the UK government invoked article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the negotiations concerning the process of withdrawal began. The EU insisted that the negotiations should be divided into two phases: the first concerning the terms of exit (the so-called ‘divorce’) and the second concerning the future relations between the UK and the EU. In December 2017, the negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU were deemed to have made sufficient progress in order to move ahead with the second stage of the negotiations. 

Brexit will have far reaching implications for finance in the UK and the EU for three main reasons. First, the financial sector makes a major contribution to the British economy and is a key component of the British model of capitalism. Second, the City of London is by far the main international financial centre in Europe and one of the largest the world. Indeed, the UK is ‘Europe’s investment banker’, as stated by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney. Third, the UK had considerable influence in the making of EU and international financial regulation in the past.​[1]​ Thus, the negotiations concerning Brexit and finance are a crucial component of the overall Brexit negotiations. This paper examines the state of the art of the negotiations on Brexit and finance from the perspective of the UK and the EU. In the UK, it analyses the preferences of three main players: the political authorities (the May Government), financial regulators (the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority) and the financial industry (concentrated in the City of London). In the EU, it examines the preferences of the largest member states (principally France and Germany), their respective financial industries, and EU regulators (the European Commission, European Central bank and European Supervisory Authorities). The time frame covered by the paper spans from the aftermath of the referendum in June 2016 to present.

To explain the preferences of UK and EU negotiators on finance, the paper employs a two-level game model. Its main insight is that, at the national level, government support rests on the ability to satisfy the demands of different coalitions of domestic groups.​[2]​ At the international level, governments seek to maximise their ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse impact of international agreements. The influence of domestic groups rests on the extent to which their support is needed in order to implement the agreement at the national level. This support takes two forms: formal support from political parties, necessary for parliamentary ratification of agreements; and informal consent from powerful economic interests, who have the power to disinvest or ‘exit’ in response to agreements that threatens their commercial interests.

Negotiating positions are forged through the aggregation of the preferences expressed by different domestic groups. Where these preferences diverge, the influence of groups will depend on the relative balance of power between them and the extent to which the government is dependent on their support. Over time the balance of power between groups may shift in response to economic or political developments (i.e. an economic downturn or changing electoral fortunes). In response, we would expect a government’s negotiating position to be revised to reflect the reconfiguration of power between domestic groups.

The likelihood of international agreement is determined by the domestic ‘win-set’: the range of possible outcomes that domestic groups are willing to support. These are determined by two main factors. First, the win-set reflects the costs of no agreement to different groups: as these costs approach zero, so groups are less likely to support any agreement which diverges from their ideal position. The second factor is the distribution of preferences amongst groups. If they have similar preferences, the win-set will be smaller: this makes international agreement less likely but (according to Schelling’s conjecture) strengthens the bargaining power of negotiators. Counter-intuitively, divergent preferences force governments to balance the competing interests of divided domestic groups which will widen the win-set: this facilitates agreement but undermines negotiating influence. We would therefore expect a government’s negotiating position to be strong if the costs of no agreement are low and/or the preferences of domestic groups are closely aligned.

Domestic groups may also be active in shaping the negotiations themselves. To facilitate agreement closer to their ideal position, groups may try to manipulate win-sets. For example, ‘dovish’ groups (whose preferences are close to the opposing win-set) will lobby international negotiators or other domestic groups to try to persuade them to soften their position, often by detailing the high costs of no agreement. They may also seek to forge alliances with groups on the opposing side in the negotiations, thereby expanding the opposition win-set and making agreement more likely. Conversely, ‘hawkish’ groups (whose preferences are far away from the opposing win-set) will seek to ensure that negotiators ‘hold the line’ by trying to reduce the costs of no agreement and thus strengthening negotiators’ bargaining position.

The following section explains the position of UK negotiators based on the domestic constraints faced at home, and how these have shifted over time. Section 3 outlines the preferences of the main EU players and explains why these have remained remarkably consistent. Section 4 concludes by reflecting on the scope for agreement in finance and the weakness of the UK’s bargaining position.

Players in the UK: the government, financial regulators, and the City of London

In the wake of the referendum of June 2016, the formulation of the UK government’s Brexit policy over the summer of 2016 was a product of the short-term demands of party management. Given the Conservatives’ slim parliamentary majority, Prime Minster Theresa May calculated that she had to adopt a hawkish position on Brexit to secure the support of her Eurosceptic backbenchers. During the autumn of 2016, the May Government sought to build a hard Brexit strategy, interpreting the referendum result as a clear signal that voters wanted the government to end freedom of movement and ECJ jurisdiction, as outlined in Prime Minister’s Conservative Party Conference speech in October 2016. In February 2017, the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech ruled out membership of the single market and customs union after Brexit, a pledge that was then enshrined in the Government’s White Paper in the same month.​[3]​ However, the White Paper also highlighted ‘a legitimate interest in mutual cooperation arrangements that recognise the interconnectedness of markets’ in finance. Senior government ministers (notably Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson) also sought to strengthen the UK’s bargaining position by making a positive case for no agreement, based on the UK’s comparative advantage in financial services and the possibility of trading under WTO rules.

After the UK general election of June 2017, which resulted in the Conservatives losing their parliamentary majority, the UK government gradually shifted towards a more dovish position. In recognition that its initial stance had alienated many Remain voters, the government deliberately toned down its hard Brexit rhetoric. The softening of the government’s position also reflected the strengthening of Chancellor Philip Hammond’s position and his championing of business concerns within the cabinet. Dropping its previous position that ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’, the government has stressed the importance of maintaining access to the single market by calling for a close and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU. In particular, senior ministers called for an agreement based on that signed between the EU and Canada (CETA), but which would also include a detailed Financial Services Chapter. Nonetheless, the government's room for manoeuvre on Brexit remained severely limited. This was because the political constraints facing UK negotiators had become more, not less, acute as a result of the government’s dependency on parliamentary support from the eurosceptic Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).

UK financial regulators adopted a surprisingly hawkish position on Brexit. Like the government, they favoured a special deal for finance and accepted that full regulatory alignment with the single market was desirable for a transition period. But longer term, regulators opposed a soft Brexit solution, in the form of an ‘off the shelf’ deal, such as UK membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). This was on the grounds that it would necessitate the UK becoming permanent ‘rule-takers’ from the EU, an outcome which was deemed inappropriate for a financial centre the size of London. In his evidence to the Treasury Select committee at the House of Commons in January 2017, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, stated that post-Brexit ‘We do not want to be a rule-taker as an authority. Right now, we are not a rule-taker; we come to a consensus within the EU…the rules in the EU are influenced by international standards and by the presence of UK officials in their development. Once we are not there, one would expect increasingly rules with which we do not agree’. 

The Bank of England also recognised that the costs of no agreement were high, not least with respect to financial stability and potential City job losses. To avoid this outcome, the Bank has been active in trying to facilitate the scope for agreement in finance by influencing the UK and EU win-sets. It did so by developing proposals whereby the UK could remain aligned to the objectives of EU financial regulation, while allowing for discretion over how these were to be achieved, by using international regulatory standards as benchmarks for determining regulatory equivalence. In June 2017, the Bank and the FCA also welcomed the European Commission’s proposals concerning the supervision of central counterparties (CCPs) involved in euro clearing. Andrew Bailey, the head of the FCA, remarked that ‘We know enough about how to do regulatory cooperation. We can make that work’. Furthermore, in December 2017 the Bank pledged to allow EU banks to maintain their UK operations under current rules following Brexit, on the assumption that a ‘high degree of supervisory cooperation with the EU’ would continue after Brexit.​[4]​

The June 2016 referendum was a shock to the UK financial industry as many of its most prominent firms had campaigned for a Remain vote. The priority for the largest global banks, whose views were represented by the main trade associations and City of London authorities, was to preserve lucrative passporting rights into the single financial market. This dovish position meant pushing for an EEA-style arrangement. To try to persuade UK negotiators, The CityUK commissioned the global management consultancy Oliver Wyman to quantify the significant costs to the UK financial sector of a no deal scenario. To facilitate agreement, the industry also targeted EU political and business audiences in an effort to try to widen the EU’s win-set. For example, the City’s Brussels office engaged with Commission officials, MEPs and key national embassies, while its special representative undertook a six-month tour of national capitals. In addition, the BBA established a European Banking Policy Network to encourage national associations across the EU to lobby their home government to maintain existing market access arrangements post-Brexit.​[5]​

Yet these efforts have been hampered by intra-industry divisions. The largest global banks, notably US investment banks plus HSBC and Barclays, strongly favoured a soft Brexit outcome as they were heavily reliant on passporting into the EU. To push this dovish position, several banks explicitly threatened to shift jobs to the EU27 in the event of no agreement by developing detailed contingency plans. By contrast, retail-focused UK banks (Lloyds, RBS and Santander) are more ambivalent and do not want the UK to become a rule-taker indefinitely. Other parts of the City, particularly investment funds and hedge funds, adopted an openly hawkish position. These sectors relied more on delegation rights, rather than passporting, to conduct cross-border trade in services which they assume would continue even in the absence of agreement. Similarly, other parts of the sector, such as private equity firms and insurers, also view Brexit as an opportunity to roll back recent pieces of post-crisis financial regulation. ​[6]​

During 2017, the position of the UK government and UK financial industry gradually converged as both shifted their positions towards each other. Following the Lancaster House speech, the main lobby group, The CityUK, took the strategic decision to replace its call for preserving full passporting rights with a ‘bespoke’ agreement. This was defined as a comprehensive Financial Services Chapter based on principles of ‘mutual market access’, the ‘mutual recognition’ of regulatory regimes, and ‘close cooperation’ between UK and EU supervisory authorities.​[7]​ They also favoured a status quo transition period to provide time for business to adapt to any final deal. In February 2018, the UK government signalled a more dovish approach by publicly endorsing the City’s preference for a financial services deal based on mutual recognition. This was followed in March 2018 by agreement with the EU over a transition period, protecting the City’s access to the EU market until at least December 2020. Finally, the government’s long-awaited White Paper on the UK’s future relationship with the EU (the so-called ‘Chequers’ deal), published in July 2018, backtracks on the earlier commitment to a bespoke deal.​[8]​ It instead proposes a looser arrangement for (financial) services outside the single market, widely interpreted by the City as a reliance on an enhancement of the EU’s existing regulatory equivalence regime for non-EU countries.

In summary, domestic political constraints stemming from the government’s parliamentary position, and reinforced by regulators’ own preferences to avoid becoming a rule-taker, forced UK negotiators to adopt an early hawkish position. By contrast, the most prominent voices within the financial industry pushed for a dovish position, but one which was undermined by intra-industry divisions. Since the June 2017 election, however, the position of the main domestic players in the UK has gradually converged: the UK government has softened its position in response to electoral failure and the increasing influence of business, while the financial industry has rowed back on its initial enthusiasm for a soft Brexit outcome. In accordance with the two-level game model, this narrowed the domestic win-set by reducing the extent of preference divergence between domestic groups. But it also served to increase the scope for agreement by shifting the position of UK negotiators closer to that of the EU, paving the way for the transition deal in March 2018. The Chequers deal has divided opinion in the City because it represents a hardening of the UK’s position. By explicitly ruling out the continuation of EU passporting in financial services, the White Paper reflects the fact that domestic political constraints at home (i.e. the absence of a clear parliamentary majority for any Brexit outcome) have increased over time. But it is also a recognition of the weakness of the UK’s bargaining position with the EU, as we outline below.

Players in the EU: national governments, supranational authorities, and the financial industry

The priority for national governments of EU27 member states was to maintain the unity of the single market. These political constraints meant adopting a hawkish position which explicitly ruled out a special deal on finance, given that this would signal that third countries could still enjoy the full benefits of single market access. The EU negotiating guidelines adopted formally by the member states in April 2017 stated that ‘Preserving the integrity of the Single Market excludes participation based on a sector-by-sector approach… there can be no “cherry picking”’. With specific reference to finance, the guidelines stated that ‘Any future framework should safeguard financial stability in the Union and respect its regulatory and supervisory regime and standards and their application’. ​[9]​  

The French and German governments faced additional domestic incentives to maintain a hard line arising from the opportunities that Brexit offered for their domestic financial centres. The French authorities adopted an unashamedly hawkish stance. In an interview to a French newspaper, the Governor of the Bank of France, Villeroy de Galhau, considered Brexit an opportunity for the euro area generally, and the Paris financial centre in particular. In September 2016, French regulators issued a joint statement saying they were ‘getting ready to welcome British-based institutions that wish to locate their business in France’ and that the licencing procedure would be simplified.​[10]​ In October 2017, newly-elected President Macron promised to reduce regulation and cut taxes for the financial sector. Of particular importance was the lucrative business of clearing euro-denominated financial instruments. In the aftermath of the referendum, senior French officials have repeatedly stated that the London would not be able to retain its dominant role and that euro clearing should be relocated to the EU27.

The position of the German government on Brexit was more ambiguous, reflecting divergent institutional voices. Initially, Finance Minister Schäuble and financial regulators discreetly supported the City of Frankfurt's efforts to attract thousands of bankers. Andreas Dombret, Bundesbank board member for banking supervision, urged banks seeking to continue to do business in Germany, or in other EU countries, after Brexit to file applications for licences as fast as possible. He also argued in favour of ‘having the bulk of the clearing business inside the euro area’. However, Bafin, the German banking regulator was concerned about the implications for financial stability and the potential for regulatory arbitrage as EU financial centres competed for post-Brexit business. It signalled a note of caution by making clear that UK banks would have to move substantial operations to Germany (or the EU27) and could not simply establish ‘letter-box’ operations. It also warned Frankfurt that Bafin was not ‘a marketing agency’ and was ‘not interested in doing industrial policy’ by luring UK based banks to Germany.​[11]​

The EU supranational authorities wanted to maintain the unity of the single market and avoid intra-EU divisions amongst member states seeking to attract financial activities from the UK. During the Brexit negotiations, the chief negotiator at the Commission, Michael Barnier, articulated a hawkish position by repeatedly ruling out the possibility of a bespoke UK-EU trade agreement which included financial services. He pointed out that ‘there is not a single trade agreement that is open to financial services. It doesn’t exist…In leaving the single market, they [UK banks] lose the financial services passport’.​[12]​ To bolster the EU’s negotiating position, in February 2017 the Commission proposed the tightening up of the procedures for assigning equivalence for ‘high impact third countries’. This was followed in June 2017 by a Commission proposal for new EU legislation that could potentially force the relocation from the UK to the EU of ‘substantially systemically important’ CCPs involved in euro clearing.

The European Supervisory Authorities and the ECB worried about a potential ‘race to the bottom’ in the EU27 post Brexit.​[13]​ In May 2017, the European Securities and Markets Authority issued guidance aimed at avoiding competition on regulatory and supervisory practices between member states. Concerns about supervisory inconsistencies were also aired by the ECB and the Single Supervisory Board. In April 2017, the ECB stated that it would not give out licenses to ‘empty shell companies’, and re-opened the issue of restricting the bulk of clearing of euro-denominated instruments to the EU by proposing a change to its own statutes. Collectively these efforts served to strengthen the EU’s bargaining position by placing greater restrictions on post-Brexit trade in financial services, thereby significantly increasing the potential costs of no agreement to the UK.

As in the UK, the financial industry across the EU27 had divergent preferences concerning Brexit. On the one hand, large financial firms had an economic interest in avoiding major disruption to cross-border financial flows. Both UK and EU-based financial entities faced significantly higher operating costs and restrictions on trade arising from Brexit. In one of its policy papers, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) described Brexit as ‘a collective action problem’, whereby ‘two essential public goods – financial stability and market efficiency – must be safeguarded’.  Similarly, in his oral evidence before the House of Lords in December 2016, the chairman of the London Stock Exchange, Xavier Rolet, warned that the relocation of euro clearing could cost investors up to €100 billion over five years. 

Despite these shared interests in a soft Brexit outcome, however, national financial associations and major financial companies struggled to form a powerful transnational coalition capable of articulating a dovish position on Brexit. The main financial centres in the EU – notably Paris, Frankfurt, Dublin, Amsterdam and Luxembourg – were all keen to attract business from the UK. In November 2016, the main financial association representing the financial centre of Paris, Europlace, produced a report arguing that Paris was very well placed to take advantage of Brexit. Similarly, the main financial association representing the financial centre of Frankfurt, Finanzplatz, championed the city and ranked it in second place behind London.​[14]​ EU-headquartered banks and associations also remained highly sensitive to national government positions. In particular, large French banks took their lead on Brexit from the Elysee Palace, not least because President Macron pressured the industry to align with the government’s hawkish position. The EU27-based financial industry has therefore been unable to widen the EU win-set because of intra-industry divisions and political pressure from national and EU officials to toe the line.





In the context of the Brexit negotiations, finance represented a pivotal issue. The scope for agreement at the start of the process was limited because UK and EU negotiators had opposing and hawkish preferences. At the EU level, both the EU institutions and EU27 national governments were concerned to uphold the integrity of the single financial market. To this end, they sought to strengthen the EU’s bargaining position by deliberately increasing the potential costs to the UK of no agreement by tightening the existing third country equivalence regime for financial regulation. Moreover, the capacity of the EU27 financial industry to push EU negotiators towards a more dovish position, in which many large firms had a clear economic interest, was undermined by domestic political pressure to compete for post-Brexit business. The EU’s position, and its narrow win set of agreement, has therefore remained surprisingly steadfast over the past two years.

In the UK, domestic political constraints, rooted in the government’s parliamentary position, and reinforced by regulators’ own preferences to avoid becoming a rule-taker, forced UK negotiators to adopt a hard Brexit position. By contrast, the most prominent voices within the UK financial industry pushed for a soft Brexit outcome, although its influence was undermined by intra-industry divisions. Since June 2017, the UK’s position has gradually softened as the government has sought to pay greater attention to the concerns of business. In addition, the financial industry’s leading voices have rowed back on their initial demands, instead calling for a bespoke agreement based on mutual recognition. In theoretical terms, preference convergence amongst the main domestic groups narrowed the UK win-set, but also increased the potential scope for agreement by shifting the position of UK negotiators closer to the EU. Evidence for this comes from the fact that UK and EU negotiators were able to reach agreement over transition in March 2018. More recently, however, the government’s position has hardened as the Chequers deal represents a reversion to the position outlined in Lancaster House; namely, that financial services will remain outside the EU single market. This backtracking reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators – acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels – has become more, not less, acute over time.
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